

slung at the left side (for right-handed shooters) and strapped to each hip. The remaining rounds went in their rucksacks.

While these figures may sound high, experience showed us that the amount of ammunition we carried was usually just enough to get us through a heavy fire-fight and leave a reserve to tide us over until the next resupply mission.

Given the intensity of combat that our light fighters can anticipate in any future conflict, it stands to reason that similar loads will be needed to sustain

them. Resupply will also be as difficult for them as it was for us, if not moreso, considering the proliferation of light air defense weapons and the limited aviation assets that will be available.

Naturally, some trade-offs will have to be made. For example, if the anticipated enemy has an armor capability, an adjustment will have to be made to incorporate Dragons and LAWs into the loads. But I'm convinced that the ammunition load schemes I've seen discussed up to this point can only lead to disaster in combat. It's time for light

fighters with combat experience to sound off and for the Infantry community to rethink the infantryman's basic load--again.

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The Bayonet

Simple But Dependable

ROBERT J. BERENS

Last year the United States Army began issuing a new version of the bayonet, the M9, to its infantrymen. In an era of complex, expensive, and exotic weapons, a new bayonet may seem anachronistic, if not downright unnecessary. Surely combat techniques have progressed beyond the need for so simple a weapon, even for use by infantrymen.

Furthermore, studies conducted since the end of World War II consistently reveal among soldiers a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the bayonet. Only a small percentage of officers and enlisted men in recent times have actually used a bayonet to kill or maim an enemy. And even some of these experienced soldiers question the bayonet's use as either a weapon, a psychological ploy, or a "combat motivator"--the reasons usually given for having a bayonet. Some believe that bayonet training is also a physical conditioner, but they concede that other

activities are as good or better. Likewise, some say that time spent on bayonet training as a combat skill would be better used for rifle marksmanship training.

In spite of such lukewarm support, however, the bayonet is not fading away--not just yet anyway. The truth is that the bayonet's roots go back a long, long way, and in its lifetime the weapon has proved to be amazingly resilient and useful.

The bayonet as we know it was invented in the 1640s by the French at Bayonne. The need at the time was for a back-up weapon that would enable a soldier to protect himself while he reloaded his cumbersome single-shot musket. It seems only natural that affixing a knife-like instrument to the end of the musket would come to mind, since knives, swords, and spears were among the first weapons fabricated by primitive man, and they had been around ever since.

Curiously, even with the advent of the rifle--which had a longer range, was more accurate, and could be reloaded faster than the musket--the bayonet continued to have a place in the infantryman's arsenal of weapons. Although it may have been kept around partly out of nostalgia, changing tactics played a larger part in the bayonet's new lease on life.

One such change occurred in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. During this war, the night attack was perfected as a new wrinkle, one that would take advantage of surprise and shock action. Night attacks, using stealth and concealment, enabled the combatants once again to close to a "kill-or-get-killed distance." In the hands of well trained troops, the bayonet was silent and dependable.

Once it was recognized that bayonet attacks gave armies an added dimension, the weapon itself drew closer attention from both inside and outside

the U.S. military services. President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, concerned himself with a replacement for the brittle "rod bayonet" then in vogue. With this encouragement, members of the Army's General Staff formed a committee and studied the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and the Philippine Insurrection.

The committee eventually selected a 16-inch knife-patterned bayonet. It was a good choice, for this basic model endured through the Korean Conflict period, although it was modified several times. With the advent of the M16 rifle, however, the pattern was changed to a "double-edged knife," the M7 bayonet. (The new M9, successor to the M7, has the more traditional single-edged look.)


The bayonet had its heyday during World War I when the dense concentrations of men and the close proximity of positions made it a dreaded and deadly weapon. Advances in warfare also served to enhance its usefulness. Previously a brutal and direct weapon, the bayonet was now sometimes used in a more subtle fashion. In gas attacks, for instance, the bayonet could be used to puncture or remove an enemy's protective mask, or to rip clothing to expose his body to deadly chemical liquids and vapors. Sappers, too, sometimes used the bayonet to probe for land mines when more suitable tools were not available.

Although the bayonet's importance diminished in the high-mobility, spread-formation tactics of World War II, it was still used at critical times with telling results. In the final drive for Tunis in April 1943, Lieutenant Ted Antonelli of New Haven, Connecticut, led Company K, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, in a night attack against well established German defenders.

The Americans managed to close within assaulting distance without being discovered, whereupon they fixed bayonets and charged into the midst of the surprised enemy. Screaming, yelling, and stabbing, Lieutenant Antonelli's troops put the startled Germans to flight and captured several. Afterward, the Americans managed to

hold the bastion by more conventional means in the face of furious German counterattacks. But the timely seizure of the hill proved to be a major step in the ultimate defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa a month later.

Not unexpectedly, the Korean Conflict, which was fought along the same lines as World War II, also provided opportunities to use the bayonet, usually in desperate circumstances. One such instance occurred in early August 1951 when Captain Lew Millet



New M9 bayonet with scabbard.

personally led his company in a wild man-to-man fight for a crucial hill. Millet and his troops, throwing hand grenades and clubbing and slashing, forced their opponents to flee in wild disorder. For his display of courage and leadership, Captain Millet was awarded the Medal of Honor.

In a far different kind of battle, the 187th Regimental Combat Team (Airborne) found the bayonet useful against rebelling Chinese prisoners of war on Kojima Island in the summer of 1952. When other weapons could be used only sparingly within the confined, disorganized, makeshift compounds, the paratroopers reduced the key compound by advancing in tight

formation behind fixed bayonets. When the defiant prisoners sought to escape the clouds of tear gas, the Americans separated them into manageable groups with a timely bayonet prod here and there.

During the Vietnam War, although engagements in the jungles were often fought close-in, which is normally ideal for bayonet fighting, other factors tended to reduce reliance on the weapon. In the often brief and furious encounters with a fleeting enemy, the small caliber, short, light, and fast-firing M16 rifle was well designed to handle the close-in fighting.

Ironically, throughout this period the bayonet probably was used elsewhere more frequently—during civil disturbances on the home front. When huge, volatile mobs gathered in major U.S. cities following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King and during the anti-war demonstrations of the late 1960s, servicemen on riot control often resorted to fixed bayonets. Seldom did they find it necessary to use the weapon, however, since its intimidating appearance usually served to sober and scatter the crowds. Studies reveal that there is no substitute for this "psychological weapon," if it can be called that, in civil disturbances.

The bayonet's psychological effect works two ways, according to some observers. Obviously, the user's main goal is to intimidate or eliminate the "target," but the bayonet also seems to have a positive effect upon the man behind it. This is especially true on the battlefield, where the bayonet wielder may be bolstered in his resolve and confidence by his single-minded purpose. A corollary effect of this phenomenon seems to be that most bayonet attacks actually never make contact: the defenders, recognizing that their defensive plan has failed, withdraw in haste. Although this is a tenuous point, there is little question that the bayonet has an undefinable yet real mystique about it.

It is true, of course, that the bayonet has often been used for purposes other than killing, maiming, and intimidating. At times these other purposes have been strongly discouraged if not prohibited, but this attitude obviously has

changed. The selection of the M9 "bayonet system" validates several of the more popular and necessary uses: The new bayonet is also a combat and field knife, a wire and metal cutter, and a saw. It would be unflattering and undeserving, though, to relegate the bayonet to its inglorious role as a "util-

ity tool." It deserves a far better fate.

Over the centuries, the bayonet in its various forms has accrued a special charm. Even now, in spite of all the impressive technological advances, it remains the ultimate man-to-man weapon, an intriguing quality indeed. Because of this aura, and its all-round

usefulness, the bayonet is likely to be with soldiers as long as they go forth to battle. How could it be otherwise?

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The New Battalion CSM

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR OTHEL TERRELL, JR.

When you walk into your first unit as a battalion command sergeant major, you won't find a road map that shows the way to success. There will be no system that lays everything out for you; nor will everything fall into place automatically. How do you start integrating yourself into the mainstream of your organization?

In most cases, your brigade command sergeant major (CSM) will give you an inbriefing, perhaps taking several sittings to complete it. Normally, your senior CSM will ask you to tell him about yourself and your military background. This is his way of getting to know you.

Your commander will also give you an initial briefing. Approach this sitting with caution, because the outcome can set the pace that will lead to a successful tour of duty, or it can start you on a downhill slide that will be almost impossible for you to recover from.

During this briefing, it is important that you take notes and ask questions. If the commander does not mention some of the subject areas you are concerned about, clarify these things at that time, and make notes on the issues you feel can wait for another day.

When these initial briefings are over, ask yourself some questions. What did I get from them? What are my priori-

ties, and how will they affect my lack of knowledge in some of the areas mentioned? You must make your decisions on the basis of your experience as a first sergeant and a platoon sergeant, in addition to your formal military education. Your real help will come from your staff NCOs. If you are reluctant (or too shy) to seek their help, you are going to have some rough days ahead.

USE STAFF NCOs

First, take the list of priorities you made while talking with your commander and start sorting these items into areas, such as individual training, support, maintenance, and administration. Then, to find out about each of these areas, ask the NCO who is responsible for it to brief you.

Once you have been briefed by the various staff section NCOs, you will then have the facts you need to conduct your first staff meeting, and you should schedule it for a time when all of the appropriate personnel can be present.

Concurrently, once the individual unit first sergeants have completed their briefings to you on their day-to-day operations, and you have had an opportunity to visit them and look at their units, you should have some con-

cept of what you need to talk to them about in your first meeting with them. It may be a good idea to discuss some short term goals and concentrate on some ideas that require immediate responses.

These are some areas you should focus on from the very beginning:

- Soldiers' appearance.
- Quality of life (billets).
- Individual training.
- Taking care of soldiers.
- Command policies and procedures.

The quality of life for soldiers living in the billets should be high on your list of priorities, and if you find yourself in the midst of a cohesive group of first sergeants, consider yourself lucky, take advantage of it, and capitalize on their knowledge and expertise.

As a CSM in your first battalion-size unit, your focus should be divided into a number of areas, but you must corral them and make them work as one. Your commander's programs and projects, for instance, will usually vary, and his leadership style may also vary as changes occur. No matter what project or program you are asked to provide feedback on, however, you should never be afraid to go back to the commander to verify details. If you are verifying policies or working on a brief-